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STUDENT NOTE 
APPOINTING FOXES TO GUARD HENHOUSES: THE 




This note addresses certain complications inherent in governance 
with regards to posted workers, i.e. workers posted on a temporary 
basis from one Member State of the Union to another, for the 
provision of services in the host Member State. In particular, this 
note attempts to explain how the current Directive 96/71/EC (the 
"Posted Workers' Directive") sets out mechanisms that produce 
socially inefficient levels of minimum protections for such posted 
workers that have to be provided by their employers. This note 
argues that none of the methods by which host Member States may 
set such levels of minimum protection (namely positive legislation, 
universally binding collective agreements, and other qualifying 
collective agreements) allow for real and credible participation 
by, and representation of, such posted workers, so much so that 
this is arguably a defining characteristic of the Directive. 
Whatever response the competent Community institutions may 
take, a way will have to be found to provide for sufficient outlets 
for the "voice" of posted workers, in order to achieve socially 
efficient levels of minimum protection. Finally, this note examines 
how such outlets for the "voice" of posted workers can be created 
within the mechanisms envisaged by the draft recommendation of 
the Commission issued on April 3, 2008. 
I.! INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................124!
II.! THE LAVAL, RÜFFERT, AND COMMISSION V. LUXEMBURG CASES.............125!
A.! Laval.....................................................................................................126!
B.! Rüffert .................................................................................................. 127!
 
 * LL.B (Hons), King’s College, London, 2008; J.D., Columbia Law School, 2008. I would like to 
thank Professors George Bermann and Olivier de Schutter of Columbia Law School, as well as Mr. and 
Mrs. Ratnam Ganesh for their continued support, forbearance and Sisyphean patience. Thanks are also 
due to Ms. Dana Green for having suggested the title, and to the Law Faculty of the National University 
of Singapore for having extended me the use of their libraries. This note was originally written under the 
title “Posted Workers and Problems of Governance” for the Seminar on Governance in the European 
Union led by Professors Charles Sabel and Olivier de Schutter at Columbia Law School in the spring of 
2008. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330685
124 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW [Vol. 15 
C.! Commission v. Luxemburg................................................................. 128!
III.! THE COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS................................................................130!
A.! Member State Concerns ......................................................................130!
B.! Community Concerns..........................................................................131!
IV.! THE HEART OF THE MATTER .........................................................................132!
V.! THE COMMISSION’S RESPONSE .....................................................................138!
A.! The Measures Taken ...........................................................................138!




The recent Laval,1 Rüffert,2 and Commission v. Luxemburg3 cases before the 
European Court of Justice concerning Directive 96/71/EC (the “Posted Workers’ 
Directive”) and the freedom to provide services under Article 49 EC have 
highlighted the precarious position of posted workers—i.e. workers posted 
temporarily from one Member State of the Union to another for the provision of 
services—as well as the general thorniness that is presented by such workers with 
respect to regulation and governance. These issues arise partly out of conflicts 
between several important policy considerations and partly out of the legal and 
political limits on the ability of the Community to regulate employment and social 
issues. 
In this note, I argue that the current mode of Community governance with 
respect to posted workers, dependent as it is upon a two-way dialogue between 
management and labor, does not adequately provide for the rights of participation 
and of representation of posted workers, as neither management nor labor has any 
real incentive to promote the interests of workers posted temporarily to the territory 
of another Member State for the purpose of providing services. I argue that the 
European Court of Justice recognizes this problem, having expressed its skepticism 
of claims put forward by both Member States and trade unions purporting to be 
primarily concerned for the welfare of posted workers in its recent case law, but is 
unable on its own to fashion a system that will create an atmosphere of fair 
competition by providing outlets for the “voice” of transnationally posted workers. 
Lastly, I argue that the Commission’s response to the recent case law of the Court, 
by calling for greater co-operation and exchange of information and best practices by 
the Member States, is useful, in that it promotes a certain kind of transparency with 
regards to the requirements posted workers and foreign service providers will be 
required to comply with in the host Member States, but does not address the root of 
the problem; i.e. the lack of representation of posted workers and of an outlet for 
their “voice.” 
 
 **  The idea for this note was suggested by ex officio statements made by Advocate General Miguel 
Poiares Maduro, sitting as a judge at the European Law Moot Court Competition 2007/2008, held at the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxemburg on April 4, 2008. 
 1 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-
11767. 
 2 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2 C.M.L.R. 39 (2008). 
 3 Case C-319/06, Comm’n v. Luxemburg, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109 (June 19, 2008). 
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II. THE LAVAL, RÜFFERT, AND COMMISSION V. LUXEMBURG CASES 
Since handing down the Rush Portuguesa decision,4 the Court has recognized 
that “Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their 
legislation, or collective labor agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to 
any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory . . . .”5 In doing 
so, the Court recognized the basic ground rules laid down by the Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980 (hereafter the “Rome 
Convention”),6 which provides in Art. 6(2) that a contract of employment will be 
governed by the law of the country where the worker habitually carries out her work, 
even if she is temporarily posted to another country. However, Art. 7 of the Rome 
Convention provides that effect shall be given to the “mandatory rules” of another 
country, the host country in particular. For example, if the host country has a valid 
rule stipulating that no work may be done on Sundays, such a rule will have to be 
complied with, in the absence of any other factors invalidating such a law. As noted 
by Advocate General Bot in his opinion in Rüffert, the content of these “mandatory 
rules” was not sketched out by the Rome Convention, leaving the Community to 
enact the Posted Workers’ Directive in accordance with Art. 20 of the same 
(providing for the precedence of Community law) in order to designate at 
Community level some mandatory rules for transnational postings:7 i.e. a “nucleus of 
mandatory rules for minimum protection.”8 The Directive thus provides in Art. 
3(1)(a)–(g) that Member States must ensure that workers posted to their territories 
are provided with guaranteed maximum work periods, paid annual holidays, and 
protective measures with regard to the terms and employment conditions of pregnant 
women, inter alia, such as are stipulated by positive law, or by collective agreements 
or arbitration awards which have been declared to be universally applicable, i.e. 
which must be observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the 
profession or industry concerned.9 For Member States (such as Sweden) which have 
neither positive minimum wage legislation, nor mechanisms for declaring collective 
agreements to be universally applicable, Article 3(8) provides for alternatives that 
the Member States “may, if they so decide, base themselves on.”10 
 
 4 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa v. Office National d’Immigration, 1990 E.C.R. I-1417. 
 5 Id. ¶ 18 (appearing almost to have been included as an afterthought, to assuage French 
“concerns”). See also Case C-62/81, Seco v. Etablissement d’assurance contre la vieillesse et l’invalidite, 
1982 E.C.R. 223, ¶ 14; Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Lda, 2002 E.C.R. I-787, ¶ 21. But see 
Laval, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 57 (noting that the application of national law or collective agreements 
must be appropriate for the purpose of posted worker protection, and must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to meet that aim). 
 6 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Oct. 9, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 
1.  
 7 See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2007 WL 
2726767 (Sept. 20, 2006); Council Directive 96/71, Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework 
of the Provision of Services, recitals 7–13, 1997 O.J. (L 18) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Posted Workers’ 
Directive]. 
 8 Posted Workers’ Directive, supra note 7, recital 13. 
 9 Id. art. 3(1)(a)–(g). 
 10 Id. art. 3(8). 
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A. Laval 
The Laval case concerned a preliminary reference under Art. 234 EC by the 
Arbetsdomstolen (Swedish Labor Court) in litigation between a Latvian contractor 
Laval un Partneri Ltd. (“Laval”), and a Swedish trade union. Laval un Partneri Ltd. 
was carrying out construction work in Vaxholm using Latvian posted workers who 
were being paid less than the minimum amount stipulated in a collective agreement 
that had neither been declared universally binding per Art. 3(8) of the Posted 
Workers’ Directive, nor came under one of the two alternative types of collective 
agreement listed in the first and second indentations of that Article. The Swedish 
union took collective action to force Laval into guaranteeing its workers the amount 
stipulated in the collective agreement, and into acceding to the collective agreement 
for the building sector. Such accession would have resulted in Laval being required 
to comply with a slew of obligations, such as making insurance payments, to the 
trade union. The questions referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (ECJ) included, first, whether a collective action taking the form of a 
blockade was compatible with, on the one hand, the EC Treaty rules on freedom to 
provide services and the prohibition of nationality discrimination, and on the other 
hand, the provisions of the Posted Workers Directive.11 The second question referred 
in Laval concerned the Swedish Lex Britannia. This rule prohibited collective action 
by trade unions aimed at setting aside collective agreements already concluded 
between labor and management. However, this prohibition was generally not 
applicable to collective action against foreign service providers only temporarily 
active in Sweden. The ECJ was asked whether the Lex Britannia violated Article 49 
EC, Article 12 EC, and/or the Posted Workers’ Directive. 
The Court held that although Recital 13 of the Preamble to the Posted Workers’ 
Directive calls for the coordination of Member States’ laws in order to lay down a 
“nucleus of mandatory rules” for minimum protection of posted workers, the 
Directive did not intend to harmonize the material content of those mandatory rules. 
The material content of those rules could be determined freely by the Member 
States, insofar as those designations fell within the limits imposed by Community 
law,12 i.e. they could not operate as obstacles to Community freedoms such as the 
freedom to provide services. Nevertheless, the Court held that the Swedish system 
was not in accordance with the Posted Workers’ Directive, because it effectively 
imposed on foreign service providers a requirement of negotiation on a case-by-case 
basis at the place of work. This system offended the Posted Workers’ Directive 
because the sort of wage rate that would be agreed upon out of such negotiations 
would not in any sense be a minimum rate of pay, which was all the Directive 
allowed Member States to require foreign undertakings to guarantee their workers.13 
Drawing on the case of Arblade and Others,14 the Court held that the Swedish 
system also offended Art. 49 EC because it was not only unjustifiable with regard to 
the objective of the protection of workers, but also because it rendered it excessively 
difficult for foreign service providers to determine from the outset what obligations 
 
 11 Laval, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 40. 
 12 Id. ¶¶ 59–60. 
 13 Id. ¶¶ 69–70. 
 14 Case C-369/96, Arblade and Others, 1999 E.C.R. I-8453, ¶ 43. 
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they would have to comply with in the host Member State.15 With regard to the Lex 
Britannia, the Court held that it effectively meant that collective agreements 
concluded by parties in another Member State would not be afforded the same level 
of protection from collective action as those agreements concluded within the host 
Member State. As such, it constituted discrimination contrary to Arts. 49 and 50 EC, 
not justified by any of the Art. 46 EC derogations under public policy, public 
security, or public health.16 In general, a matter that appeared to weigh rather heavily 
in the minds of the judges was that the collective agreement the trade unions sought 
to impose on Laval contained many obligations that were either over and above the 
minimum protections enumerated in Article 3(8) of the Directive, or were more 
onerous than those imposed by positive Swedish legislation with respect to those 
minimum protections. 
B. Rüffert 
The Rüffert case concerned the legality of the Landesvergabegesetz of Land 
Niedersachsen which required public authorities, when awarding public contracts to 
successful tenderers, to require tenderers to agree to pay their workers, and the 
workers of their sub-contractors, a wage stipulated in a non-universally binding 
collective agreement, which was merely supplementary to the “TV Mindestlohn” 
collective agreement that had been declared to be universally binding across the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the Landesvergabegesetz provided for 
penalties for violation of this agreement amounting to fines of one percent of the 
value of the contract awarded, in addition to termination of the contract. 
The Court held that the provisions of the Landesvergabegesetz considered in the 
case were in violation of the Posted Workers’ Directive for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the use of non-universally-binding collective agreements to determine 
minimum rates of pay was permitted under the Directive only when the Member 
State had neither positive minimum wage legislation nor means of declaring 
collective agreements to be universally binding. The Federal Republic of Germany 
had in place such mechanisms of declaring collective agreements universally 
applicable, and as such was precluded from imposing non-universally binding 
collective agreements upon foreign service providers. Secondly, the Court held that 
the Landesvergabegesetz effectively meant that foreign service providers working on 
public projects would be required to pay their posted workers at the rate stipulated in 
the Niedersachsen collective agreement, while those working on private projects 
would not be so required. It could legitimately be asked if the pay rate stipulated in 
the collective agreement was really the bare minimum essential for a decent living 
standard in Niedersachsen when the law imposed it on only one sector of the 
profession. Importantly, the Court rejected a reading of Art. 3(7) of the Directive 
(providing that paragraphs 1–6 of that Article shall not be construed to prevent the 
application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favorable to 
workers)17 as meaning that the Directive only created a floor with regards to 
minimum protections which Member States were free to exceed. Such a reading was 
 
 15 Laval, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 110. 
 16 Id. ¶ 119. 
 17 See also Posted Workers’ Directive, supra note 7, recital 17. 
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impermissible as the Directive had to be read in the light of Article 49 EC, meaning 
that it could not be construed as authorizing hindrances and obstacles to the freedom 
to provide services. 
C. Commission v. Luxemburg 
Commission v. Luxemburg was brought as an infringement proceeding under 
Art. 226 EC. The case concerned the compatibility of the Luxemburg Law of 20 
December 2002 with the Posted Workers’ Directive, with particular regard to the 
scope of Member States to impose obligations on foreign service providers that do 
not derive from the mandatory rules for minimum protection in Article 3(1)(a)–(g) of 
the Directive, but from national “public policy” needs under Article 3(10) of the 
Directive.18 
Article 1 of the Luxemburg Law of 20 December 2002 included four 
“mandatory” provisions that were not contained in Article 3(1) of the Directive, and 
were therefore derived from domestic public policy reasons.19 These were: firstly, 
the requirement of a written employment contract or other document pursuant to 
Council Directive 91/553/EEC;20 secondly, the requirement of equal treatment part-
time and fixed-term workers;21 thirdly, the requirement of indexation of wages to the 
cost of living;22 and fourthly, the requirement of compliance with all laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions and provisions of universally applicable 
collective agreements that “concern” collective labor agreements.23 
The Court held that the concept of “public policy” in Community law operates 
as a justification for derogations from the freedoms afforded by the Treaty, meaning 
therefore that it cannot be invoked unilaterally by Member States, and that it must be 
interpreted strictly.24 Applied in the context of the Directive, this implies that Art. 
 
 18 Id. art. 3(10). This section of the Posted Workers’ Directive provides that the Directive does not 
preclude the application by Member States to domestic undertakings and “the undertakings of other 
States” of “terms and conditions of employment on matters other than those referred to in the first 
subparagraph of paragraph 1 in the case of public policy provisions,” if Member States are acting in 
compliance with the Treaty, and if the principle of “equality of treatment” is adhered to. 
 19 Other issues that were litigated in the case included the minimum rest periods imposed by Art. 
1.1.3 of the Law of 20 December 2002 (Law of 20 December 2002, Memorial A 2002, p. 3722 (Lux.)); 
the requirement under Art. 7 thereof that foreign service providers furnish basic information to the 
Inspection du travail et des mines (Labor and Mines Inspectorate) to facilitate the monitoring of posted 
workers, and the requirement of an ad hoc agent of the foreign service provider resident in Luxemburg, 
from whom the Labor and Mines Inspectorate may obtain documents and information. Id. art. 8. With 
respect to the minimum rest periods, the Government of Luxemburg conceded that its regulations 
concerning that issue were too restrictive and that it had since amended them. Comm’n v. Luxemburg, 
2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109, ¶¶ 70–71. Regarding the obligations on foreign service providers to 
furnish the Labor and Mines Inspectorate with information and to retain an ad hoc agent in Luxemburg, 
the Court held that the rules mandating the former were sufficiently vague and unclear as to discourage 
foreign undertakings from exercising their freedom to provide services, id. at ¶ 81, and that regarding the 
latter, Luxemburg had failed to show that the requirement of a resident agent was necessary in order to 
make the Inspectorate’s work feasible. Id. ¶¶ 91–95.  
 20 Law of 20 December 2002. Art. 1.1.1 says that Council Directive 91/553/EEC was enacted for 
the purpose of ensuring that employees are given notice of the conditions and terms of their employment. 
 21 Id. art. 1.1.8. 
 22 Id. art. 1.1.2. 
 23 Id. art. 1.1.11. 
 24 Comm’n v. Luxemburg, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109, ¶ 30.  
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3(10) of the Directive must be read as a derogation from the “exhaustive” list of 
mandatory rules contained in Art. 3(1) of the same,25 and must therefore be 
interpreted strictly. In addition, by the very terms of Art. 3(10) of the Directive, the 
fact that Member States are allowed to designate as mandatory protections issues 
other than those in Art. 3(1) does not mean that they are relieved of the obligation to 
comply with Treaty provisions, such as Art. 49 EC (on the freedom to provide 
services).26 
Concerning the requirement of written employment contracts, the fact that it 
derives from Directive 91/553/EEC means that it is a protection already included in 
the legislation of the posted workers’ home Member States. As such, the Luxemburg 
legislation simply duplicated the burdens of foreign service providers, without 
adding to the protection of posted workers.27 Similarly, the requirement of equal 
treatment of part-time and posted workers was held to be equally superfluous28 and 
needlessly burdensome, since those obligations were already imposed on foreign 
service providers in their home Member States through the instrumentality of 
Directives 97/81/EC and 1999/70/EC.29 
With respect to the requirement of automatic indexation of wages to living 
costs, the Court held that the mischief lay not in Luxemburg’s indexation of 
minimum wages to living costs—Art. 3(1)(c) of the Directive expressly allows 
this30—but in the indexation of all wages to living costs, even those wages that did 
not fall within the category of minimum wages.31 Art. 3(1)(c) had been enacted with 
a view to ensuring that minimum rates of pay would be in line with domestic living 
standards within the Member State. The extension of that notion to cover all wage 
rates would take any such legislation beyond the scope of the Directive. Therefore, 
such legislation could only be enacted under the Art. 3(10) public policy exception, 
which, as mentioned above, must be seen as a derogation that is to be interpreted 
strictly and which is invalid if in contravention of Treaty freedoms. The Court deftly 
disposed of the question by stating that Luxemburg had adduced no evidence to 
support its arguments that such legislation was a necessary and proportionate means 
to achieve the desired goal of promoting good labor relations within Luxemburg by 
maintaining the purchasing power of workers’ wages.32 
Lastly, with respect to the final issue, the Court analyzed all the possible 
meanings of Art. 1.1.11 of the Law of 20 December 2002. If it meant that all laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions and provisions in universally applicable 
collective agreements concerning the drawing up of collective labor agreements 
were mandatory provisions under Luxemburg law, then it would be clearly 
 
 25 Id. ¶ 31. 
 26 Comm’n v. Luxemburg, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109, ¶ 33. 
 27 Id. ¶¶ 41–43. 
 28 Id. ¶ 60. 
 29 See id. ¶ 56 (describing the connection between the two Directives).  
 30 Posted Workers’ Directive, supra note 7, recital 13, art. 3(1). The final paragraph of Art. 3(1) of 
the Directive provides that “[f)]or the purposes of [the] Directive, the concept of minimum rates of pay 
referred to in paragraph 1(c) is defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member State to whose 
territory the worker is posted.” 
 31 Comm’n v. Luxemburg, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109, ¶¶ 47–48. 
 32 Id. ¶¶ 52–54. 
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incompatible with the Directive, as there was no reason why the procedural integrity 
of collective labor agreements should be an imperative issue of public policy, 
without more.33 If it meant that the actual provisions of all Luxemburg collective 
labor agreements were to be mandatory provisions, then Art. 1.1.11 was even more 
plainly incompatible with the Directive, as the Directive allows that only for 
collective agreements declared to be universally applicable.34 
III. THE COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS 
At present, according to estimates by the EU Commission,35 there are within the 
EU around 1 million posted workers.36 In order to simplify examination of the 
issues, it will be useful to differentiate the diverse concerns into those operating 
mainly at the Member State level, and those operating at the Community level. It is 
of course acknowledged that the two levels of concerns do not separate cleanly, and 
that they all ultimately call for resolution at the Community level. 
A. Member State Concerns 
At the Member State level, the influx of posted workers from the new Member 
States that may result from a liberalization of worker protection rules promises to 
alleviate the high cost of many primary sector services in the more affluent western 
European states (such as the construction industry). However, with unemployment 
levels relatively high at 7.5% in France37 and 9.0% in Germany,38 many of the older 
and more affluent Member States are wary of the undercutting of national wage 
levels by cheap labor from outside. Needless to say, the host Member States also 
have to deal with the public disaffection and political cost that is incurred by 
increasing numbers of posted workers coming in from the rest of Europe. 
Furthermore, these Member States have a legitimate interest in ensuring certain 
minimum standards of pay and working conditions for the workforce in their 
territory, such as will be congruent to the living standards and quality of life the 
citizens of those Member States generally expect. The posted workers who enter the 
host Member States will have to live there for the period of their posting, and these 
Member States quite legitimately wish to avoid situations where the posted workers 
have to resort to desperate measures to cope with the sometimes drastically reduced 
purchasing power of their home-Member-State wages in their host Member Sates. 
Additionally, and more fundamentally, those Member States that play host to 
the posted workers have well-established and entrenched labor regulatory systems 
that may be overhauled only with considerable trauma. Linked to this is the 
 
 33 Id. ¶ 65. 
 34 Id. ¶ 66. 
 35 Press Release IP/08/514, European Comm’n, EU Calls for Urgent Action to Improve Working 
Conditions for 1 Million Posted Workers, (Apr. 3, 2008), (quoting Vladimir Spidla, EU Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Commissioner, discussing, “The estimated 1 million posted 
workers in the EU”) [hereinafter EU Calls for Urgent Action]. 
 36 See Posted Workers’ Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(1), 
 37 U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: France (2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
3842.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (stating unemployment rate for the first quarter of 2008). 
 38 U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Germany (2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
3997.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (stating annualized average for 2007).  
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preservation of the integrity of the Member States’ social welfare systems. At first 
glance, this last concern may not appear to be the foremost of policy concerns due to 
the fact that posted workers are in the host Member State only temporarily. 
However, where periods of “temporary” employment are substantial, such as when 
the posting is for two years, the host Member State’s social welfare and healthcare 
systems may come under considerable strain. From the point of view of the posted 
workers’ home Member States, it may not be desirable for their skilled workers to 
emigrate en masse to take on even unskilled jobs in more affluent host Member 
States,39 as this might result in the formation of labor shortages in those home 
Member States. As a recent issue of The Economist notes, “the idea has taken hold 
across central and eastern Europe that the most pressing crisis is a shortage of 
people. Every day, newspapers and magazines report plans to ship in Vietnamese 
textile-workers, Ukrainian road-builders or Moldovan waiters to fill vacancies.”40 
B. Community Concerns 
From the Community’s perspective, the regulation of posted workers presents a 
problem for Community integration and internal market development, in that the 
movement of cheap labor from the less affluent “new” Member States to the more 
affluent “old” Member States could potentially cause wages across the EU to fall 
dramatically, at least in the short term, resulting in a “race to the bottom” with 
respect to wages, especially in primary sector industries. According to Vladimír 
!pidla, EU Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Commissioner, 
“The estimated 1 million posted workers in the EU play a vital role in addressing 
labour shortages in the European jobs market. The posting of workers directive aims 
to benefit service providers and workers alike, but Member States must improve 
cooperation if we are to effectively protect working conditions and avoid a race 
towards the lowest minimum rates of pay in the EU as a whole."41  
The specific tool the Community may use to address this problem is Art. 136 
EC, which provides the Community with the competence to legislate on social 
policy, via the Qualified Majority Voting mechanism, and obligates the Community 
to bring about improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonization while improvement is being made.42 
A second issue, which Laval and Rüffert made abundantly clear, is that the 
pursuit of Community integration and internal market development is often at odds 
with fundamental rights. Both cases involved a clash between fundamental 
Community freedom to provide services, as enshrined in Art. 49 EC, and the right of 
 
 39 Brian Bercusson, The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day, 13 EUR. 
L. J. 279, 307 (2007). 
 40 The Dark Side of Globalization, THE ECONOMIST: A SPECIAL REPORT ON EU ENLARGEMENT, 
May 31, 2008, at 5. The article proceeds to refute the idea of labor shortages as being credible, citing that 
“[e]mployment rates in Slovakia, Hungary and Poland hover at or below 60% of the working-age 
population, compared with Denmark’s 77%.” Id. at 7. However, the important point is that such 
perceptions do exist, and are likely to color the policy choices of these home Member States. 
 41 EU Calls for Urgent Action, supra note 35. 
 42 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 2, Nov. 10, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 
[hereinafter EC Treaty], which calls for promotion of “a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities” and a “high level of employment and social protection.” 
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collective action, which, according to established Strasbourg jurisprudence,43 is an 
emanation of freedom of association, protected under Article 11 ECHR. This issue 
raises important questions about the role of social rights in the EU, and specifically 
about the historical evolution of the Community from an entity serving purely 
economic purposes to a quasi-federal polity charged with the protection and 
promotion of constitutional rights. 
IV. THE HEART OF THE MATTER 
There is some linkage between the first and second of the Community concerns 
mentioned in Part III(B), as the vindication of the right of collective action is 
arguably essential to the achievement of an efficient internal market for labor. “The 
rationale for free movement is market integration. Market integration is premised on 
market efficiency. Market efficiency requires collective action by workers and trade 
unions to ensure their voice in heard and their interests are taken account of.”44 The 
rationale behind the importance of allowing the “voice” of labor to be heard is 
further developed by Poiares Maduro: “the system requires a set of social rights that 
can be said to guarantee participation and representation in market decisions and, by 
internalizing costs which tend to be ignored in those decisions, increase efficiency. 
These social norms are related to forms of voice and exit in the market . . . . Free 
movement of persons and rights of participation and representation such as the 
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective 
action should be considered as instrumental to a fully functioning integrated market 
which can increase efficiency and wealth maximization.”45 
One fact that might be of some interest is that the Court followed neither of the 
opinions of Advocates-General Mengozzi and Bot in Laval46 and Rüffert,47 which 
 
 43 See, e.g., Schmidt & Dahlström v. Sweden, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). 
 44 Bercusson, supra note 39, at 290. The “market integration” rationale was recently affirmed in  
Comm’n v. Luxemburg, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109, ¶ 42 (internal citations omitted), where the 
Court held, that  
although Community law does not preclude Member States from applying their 
legislation or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry to 
any person who is employed, even temporarily, no matter in which Member State 
the employer is established . . . such a possibility is subject to the condition that the 
workers concerned, who are temporarily working in the host Member State, do not 
already enjoy the same protection, or essentially comparable protections by virtue 
of obligations to which their employer is already subject in the Member State in 
which it is established. 
The next paragraph provides that the market integration rationale is especially applicable in the context of 
the freedom to provide services. See id. ¶ 43. 
 45 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social 
Rights in the EU, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 470 (Philip Alston ed., 1999). 
 46 In his opinion in Laval, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, Advocate General Mengozzi concluded that the 
Swedish system of leaving determination of wages entirely to both sides of industry did not in itself 
constitute inadequate transposition of the Posted Workers’ Directive. Moreover, he opined that the Posted 
Workers’ Directive did not preclude any collective action in the form of a blockade and/or solidarity 
action, aimed at forcing a foreign service provider to guarantee its posted workers a minimum rate of pay 
in accordance with the terms of a collective agreement which was, for all practical purposes, applied very 
widely in that particular industry in the host Member State. However, such collective action had to be 
motivated by a suitable objective in the public interest, such as worker protection, and the combating of 
social dumping. Furthermore, in considering whether the collective action was proportionate, the national 
Court had to examine whether the terms and conditions therein really contributed to the social protection 
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both upheld the legality of the collective action and domestic legal provisions 
respectively. Two opinions that fared somewhat better were those of Advocate 
General Trstenjak in Commission v. Luxemburg, which was followed by the Court 
for the most part,48 and that of the now Advocate General Poiares Maduro in the 
Viking Line case,49 where he rehearsed and built upon his earlier arguments 
concerning voice and representation. 
At ¶¶ 59 and 60 of the opinion in Viking Line, Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro states that  
the European economic order is firmly anchored in a social 
contract: workers throughout Europe must accept the recurring 
negative consequences that are inherent to the common market’s 
creation of increasing prosperity, in exchange for which society 
must commit itself to the general improvement of their living and 
working conditions, and to the provision of economic support to 
those workers who, as a consequence of market forces, come into 
difficulties . . . . The right to associate and the right to collective 
action are essential instruments for workers to express their voice 
and to make governments and employers live up to their part of the 
social contract . . . . Accordingly, the rights to associate and to 
collective action are of a fundamental character within the 
 
of posted workers and did not simply duplicate the protection already afforded them by collective 
agreements in their home Member State. 
 47 In his opinion in Rüffert, 2007 WL 2726767, Advocate General Bot concluded that the 
Landesvergabegesetz was not in violation of the Posted Workers’ Directive because that Directive 
arguably only set a minimum “floor” which Member States were free to exceed, in accordance with Art. 
3(7) of the Directive’s provision that nothing should prevent the provision of more robust guarantees of 
minimum protection than those mandated in Art. 3(1). Moreover, he argued the Landesvergabegesetz did 
not violate the freedom to provide services under Article 49, because it was motivated by the objective 
justification of protecting workers and avoiding social dumping, and was moreover entirely proportionate, 
as no other less intrusive measure would have been able to achieve a level of parity between local and 
posted worker’s salaries. 
 48 Advocate General Trstenjak, in his opinion of September 13, 2007, provisionally concluded that 
the Luxemburg legislation was compatible with the Posted Workers’ Directive, conditional upon an 
objective showing by the Luxemburg government that the automatic indexation of all wages to living 
standards worked to the advantage of minimum wage rates (¶ 54):  
Sofern das Gesetz vom 20. Dezember 2002 nach objektiven Maßstäben nämlich 
dahin gehend auszulegen ist, dass eine allgemeine Anpassung der Entlohnung an 
die Entwicklung der Lebenshaltungskosten stattfindet, die sich gleichfalls zum 
Vorteil der Mindestlöhne auswirkt, erfüllt Art. 1 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 des Gesetzes vom 20. 
Dezember 2002 die gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Vorgaben in Art. 3 Abs. 1 Buchst. c 
der Richtlinie 96/71.  
The Court declined to follow Advocate General Trstenjak in this regard, holding instead that only 
indexation of minimum wages to living standards was allowed by the Directive. See Comm’n v. 
Luxemburg, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1109, ¶ 47. 
 49 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779. Although this case did not concern the 
Posted Workers’ Directive, it remains extremely pertinent to this discussion for the reason that it involved 
a Finnish trade union that was seeking to prevent a Finnish shipping company from reincorporating in 
Estonia, in order to take advantage of cheaper labor costs. As such, it involves similar questions of 
transnational migration, albeit of employers rather than of workers. Although it does not apply directly to 
posted workers, it is nevertheless important for the purposes of determining the balance between the right 
to collective action and fundamental Community freedoms. 
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Community legal order, as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union reaffirms. The key question, however, that lies 
behind the present case, is to what ends collective action may be 
used and how far it may go.
50 
At this point, one must note that the Court did not follow Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro’s opinion entirely. First, the Court held inadmissible the question 
about whether Art. 49 EC was horizontally directly effective against the ITF, the 
labor representative in the case. Second, and more importantly, the Court did not rule 
definitively on whether the collective action by the trade unions was motivated by 
overriding reasons of public interest such as worker protection and thereby 
objectively justified, but held that that question, as well as the proportionality of the 
collective action, was a factual matter the national courts had to decide on their own. 
Nevertheless, there are some indications that Advocate General Maduro’s emphasis 
on “voice” did not leave the Court unmoved. In Viking, the Court observed that it 
was evident from the record that the FOC policy of the ITF required it to  
initiate solidarity action against the beneficial owner of a vessel 
which is registered in a State other than that of which that owner is 
a national, irrespective of whether or not that owner’s exercise of 
its right of freedom of establishment is liable to have a harmful 
effect on the work or conditions of employment of its employees.51  
In other words, the Court recognized that the ITF’s FOC policy was not sensitive to 
the needs of unique groups of workers, and that such workers had no effect or 
influence over the ITF’s conduct. 
This leads us to ask whether the governance model envisaged by the Posted 
Workers’ Directive, which is essentially centered on the concept of the social 
dialogue,52 can cater adequately for the realities of a 25-member EU in the context of 
the transnational provision of services. The rub in this system with respect to posted 
workers, is that it is difficult to determine who provides the legitimate “voice” of 
posted workers. On the facts in the Laval case, for example, one would have good 
reason to mistrust the claims of both the foreign undertakings on the one hand, and 
of the trade unions and Member State governments53 on the other, purporting to be 
the voice of the posted workers. The former are clearly in a position of conflict due 
to their interest in extracting the maximum amount of labor from the posted workers 
at the minimum price, but the latter are also conflicted due to their interest in 
 
50  Id. ¶¶ 59–60 (emphasis added).  
51  Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779, ¶ 89. 
 52 See Commission Communication on the European Social Dialogue, a Force for Innovation and 
Change, at 6, COM (2002) 341 final (June 26, 2002) (“The social dialogue is rooted in the history of the 
European continent, and this distinguishes the Union from most other regions of the world.”). Moreover, 
in Laval, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 105, the Court noted the duty of the Community under Art. 136 EC to 
promote “dialogue between management and labour.” 
 53 It is possible, though not likely, that a Member State government will actively promote the cause 
of posted workers against that of the trade unions. However, one such example might obtain in the UK, 
which, in its submissions in Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779, argued that there was no fundamental right to 
take collective action under Community law. See, Bercusson, supra note 39, at 300. However, it is unclear 
whether the UK government’s historical enmity with trade unions will extend so far as to promote the 
cause of posted workers. 
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ensuring that posted workers’ wages are as high as possible, so that their members 
are not thrown out of work by the influx of cheap foreign labor. The awkwardness of 
the positions of the social partners with respect to posted workers is easily 
discernible from the Laval case. In Laval, a trade union purporting to seek increased 
social protection for posted workers instituted a blockade resulting in the foreign 
service provider becoming insolvent and the posted workers losing their jobs. 
Leaving aside collective agreements and arbitration awards, the social dialogue 
model also fails to evolve positive legislation such as minimum wage laws that set 
efficient social protection levels, primarily because of the inapplicability of 
traditional methods of labor representation to posted workers. As established above, 
posted workers as a result of their transient nature, do not have the ability to unionize 
effectively. Consequently, they are unable to wield influence through political 
channels to effect changes in host Member State legislation to their benefit. As 
Poiares Maduro recognizes, “not all have the same capacity for mobility . . . not all 
have the same opportunities (with respect to “voice”): unemployed people have 
much less voice than unionized labour or organized capital, for example.”54 The 
same is true with regards to the relationship between posted workers and trade 
unions. A demonstration of this reality may be found in Rüffert, where the minimum 
wage set by the Landesvergabegesetz was even higher than what the Federal 
universally binding collective agreement provided for, such that the posted workers 
ended up being paid only forty-six percent of that wage. 
For these reasons, this EU social dialogue model is not unlike sending two 
mutually ill-disposed foxes to guard a particular henhouse.55 Thus the posted worker 
invariably finds herself buffeted between two extremes, as they find that their 
interests are represented by a predator on the one hand, and by a competitor on the 
other. 
At first glance it might appear that these two countervailing forces could interact 
with each other in such a way as to result in an equilibrium, which will provide for a 
socially efficient level of protections for posted workers. However, this will not be 
the case because it is possible to make conditions of employment of posted workers 
costly for foreign service providers, without adding anything meaningful to the 
welfare of those posted workers. Clearly, the terms and conditions of collective 
agreements concluded under such conditions in the host Member State between 
management and labor may not be entirely germane to the needs of the posted 
workers. For example, in Laval, the collective agreement that was sought to be 
imposed upon the Latvian service provider contained many provisions that should 
not have been applicable to the posted workers, or which would have duplicated 
protections already available in the posted workers’ home States. A good example 
would be the payment obligations under the collective agreement imposed upon the 
Latvian service provider, which were variously meant to enable the trade union to be 
able to carry out pay reviews, and for insurance premiums. The pay review is 
 
 54 Poiares Maduro, supra note 45, at 470.  
 55 The metaphor unfortunately requires some tweaking, such that rather than both the foxes 
battling each other in order to exclude the other from the chickens, one fox seeks to devour the chickens, 
while the other fox seeks to get run them off. Perhaps a more accurate illustration would be replacing one 
fox with the hated farmyard competitor of the chicken—the turkey. 
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something that would not have been of any use to the posted workers, due to the 
temporary nature of their stay in Sweden. The insurance policies envisioned in the 
collective agreement would have replicated insurance protections already provided 
the posted workers in their home Member State. Importantly, as the Court 
recognized in Laval, there is considerable concern over the precariousness of the 
posted workers’ and foreign service providers’ plights, because the Swedish system 
is productive of far too much uncertainty, in that the only way a foreign service 
provider or posted worker could determine their obligations and entitlements 
respectively under the head of a minimum rate of pay, was to actually turn up in the 
host Member State, endure case-by-case negotiations at the place of work, and run 
the risk of being thrown out of work or business by the disruption resulting from 
collective action. The procedure of collective action itself imposes forbidding costs 
on foreign service providers. 
Of course, one does not deny that it is theoretically possible that there may be 
labor representatives who will be sincerely concerned about the protection of posted 
workers. However, as is generally the case with persons who are in positions of 
conflict, the selflessness of their conduct is not to be presumed. As a result, although 
there is some possibility that the two foxes will somehow cancel each other out, the 
plight of the chickens remains uncertain and decidedly unenviable. 
At this point one may interpose questions about whether the provision of a 
“voice” and of avenues for representation and participation of posted workers are 
actually essential to proper determination of the adequate level of minimum 
protection. First, it may be asked if the current state of affairs under the Posted 
Workers’ Directive is not acceptable, given the active policing of the ECJ. It is 
argued that this “negative integration” will not in itself be sufficient to ensure 
socially efficient levels of minimum protections. Certain sources of inefficiency, 
such as the duplication of protections among Member States can be avoided with 
relative ease and clarity by reference to the Court’s jurisprudence. Other questions—
generally pertaining to the material content of the minimum protections—involve 
proportionality analyses that the Court may not be best placed to answer. Although 
the Court has, since the handing down of the Cassis de Dijon case, carried out a risk 
assessment role via the doctrine of proportionality,56 it is argued that the larger part 
of such risk assessment should be—and indeed is—carried out by committees, which 
will possess the requisite ability to provide scientific evidence and advice to the 
Commission.57 Moreover, while it is true that the Court may strike down these 
Member State enactments for disproportionality as and when they come before it, the 
costs of litigation are prohibitively high, and the speed of resolution of the questions 
excruciatingly slow. 
Second, one may ask whether “voice,” representation, and participation are even 
useful ways of thinking about the problem. Let us consider a collective agreement 
arrived at in the home Member State between management and labor, setting out 
 
 56 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: “Comitology” as Revolution–Infranationalism, 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS 337, 
345 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999). 
 57 Alexandra Gatto, Governance in the European Union: A Legal Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 487, 503 (2006).  
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minimum rate of pay terms to be applied to workers posted to each and every host 
Member State. If the minimum rate of pay agreed upon in that collective agreement 
falls below the corresponding minimum wage for that sector or profession as set out 
either by positive legislation or qualifying collective agreement in the host Member 
State, would we prefer to see the home Member State collective agreement trump the 
minimum wage of the host Member State because the posted workers already had 
their say? Under the current Posted Workers’ Directive, the terms of collective 
agreements concluded within the home Member State are irrelevant.58 Instead, the 
Directive gives precedence solely to the mandatory requirements of the host Member 
State. It is submitted that this is indeed correct, but not because of formalistic 
conceptions of due process. It is the correct approach not least because of Arts. 6(1) 
and 7 of the Rome Convention, but also because it is doubtful that such collective 
agreements concluded the Member States that tend to produce posted workers will 
be very robust or credible. For example, the Commission noted, prior to the last 
enlargement, that “the system of social partnership and independent social dialogue 
in the candidate countries is relatively weak, particularly at sectoral level . . . .”59 
Instead, it is submitted that some mechanism be devised, by which posted workers 
may contribute to the host Member State’s process of determining the “material 
content” of the minimum protections to be afforded them. It may be noted at this 
point that the Court in Laval held that Member States were free to determine the 
material content of the minimum protections as long as they were in compliance with 
the Treaty and General Principles of Community law.60 Indeed, in the Impact 
judgment delivered on April 15, 2008, the Court re-emphasized this holding by 
stating that  
the establishment of the level of the various constituent parts of the 
pay of a worker falls outside the competence of the Community 
legislature and is unquestionably still a matter for the competent 
bodies in the various Member States, those bodies must 
nevertheless exercise their competence consistently with 
Community law . . . in the areas in which the Community does not 
have competence.”61  
However, by reaching the decision it reached in Rüffert, the Court essentially held 
that while the Member States could determine the material content of their minimum 
wage provisions freely, the procedures to be taken in making such a determination 
could be fixed by the Community. 
Third, would “transnationalizing” the trade unions cure the problem of posted 
workers not being given a “voice”? The concept of the European Social Dialogue, as 
understood in its strict sense, already includes the notion of “transnationalization.” 
As noted by Smisman, for the purposes of the European Social Dialogue, 
 
 58 Art. 3(1) of the Posted Workers’ Directive provides that for “the purposes of this Directive, the 
concept of minimum rates of pay referred to in paragraph 1(c) is defined by the national law and/or 
practice of the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted.” Posted Workers’ Directive, supra 
note 7, recital 13. 
 59 European Social Dialogue, supra note 52, at 6. See also THE ECONOMIST, supra note 40. 
 60 Laval, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 60. 
 61 Case C-268/06, Impact, 2 C.M.L.R. 47 (2008), ¶ 129. 
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“‘Management and Labour’ are the European confederations of the social partners, 
organized either at cross-sectoral or sectoral level.”62 It is submitted that 
transnationalizing trade unions can only resolve the problem in certain of the 
Member States, because not all Member States allow for the determination of the 
material content of their mandatory protection rules via collective agreements. Even 
in those Member States where collective action is the main determining mechanism 
of minimum protections for labor, blockages can and do occur, as is evident from the 
Viking case. As noted again by Smisman, “[i]n practice, the principle of ‘mutual 
recognition’ has mainly led to negotiations between the general cross-industry 
organizations, namely, ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), UNICE 
(European Confederation of Employers’ Organisations) and CEEP (Confederation of 
Public Sector Employers).”63 Such transnational labor representative organizations 
do not have a uniform constituency; the interests of workers in the new Member 
States tend to be considerably different from those of similar sectors in the old 
Member States. Given the as yet relatively underdeveloped stature of the social 
partners in the new Member States, it is possible that the voices of the workers who 
tend to become posted workers are drowned out. Put differently, the use of 
transnational labor representatives has the effect of rarefying by one level the 
participation and representation of posted workers. This contravenes the stated aim 
of “maximi[zing] the use of existing instruments of concertation.”64 Clearly, the 
subsumption of posted workers under the banner of traditional labor representation 
will not constitute maximization of the existing instruments of concertation. This is 
not to say that every single interest group should have representation as a social 
partner under the bipartite social dialogue. Instead, posted workers should have 
specific representation because to deny them such representation would lead to 
socially inefficient outcomes. 
V. THE COMMISSION’S RESPONSE 
A. The Measures Taken 
On the same day the Rüffert judgment was handed down, the Commission 
issued a press release calling for “more effective exchange of information, better 
access to information and exchange of best practice.”65 In the Draft 
Recommendation that accompanied the press release, the Commission focused on 
the pre-existing obligations in the Posted Workers’ Directive upon Member States to 
make information regarding the terms and conditions generally available, “not only 
to foreign service providers, but also to the posted workers concerned.”66 The Draft 
Recommendation further states that “there are still justified concerns as to the way 
the Member States have implemented and/or apply in practice the rules on 
 
 62 Stijn Smismans, The European Social Dialogue Between Constitutional and Labour Law, 32 
EUR. L. REV. 341, 342 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 63 Id. at 343. 
 64 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Mar. 25–26, 2004), at 7. 
 65 EU Calls for Urgent Action, supra note 35. 
 66 Commission Recommendation on Enhanced Administrative Cooperation in the Context of the 
Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services (Draft Apr. 31 2008), pmbl. ¶ 2, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2008/apr/postingworkers_en.pdf. 
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administrative cooperation as provided for by” the Posted Workers’ Directive.67 The 
Draft Recommendation then stated that “Urgent action is required to remedy 
shortcomings in the implementation, application and enforcement of the legislation 
pertaining to the posting of workers,”68 with respect to the exchange of information, 
and access thereto. 
The actual recommendations of the Commission were: firstly, to set up an 
electronic information exchange system such as the Internal Market Information 
System (IMI); and secondly, to develop a specific69 “application to support the 
administrative cooperation necessary to improve the practical implementation of the 
Posted Workers’ Directive.”70 With respect to the development of an electronic 
information exchange system for the administrative cooperation, the Commission 
notes that one task for the Member States would be the identification of “the main 
issues and questions on which the information will have to be exchanged and which 
thus should be included in the exchange system,”71 and second, the identification of 
“the competent authorities and, if necessary, other actors involved in the monitoring 
and control of the employment conditions of posted workers that will take part in the 
exchange system.”72 With respect to access to information, in addition to increasing 
the ease of reference (i.e. through providing information in the local language), 
Member States should “take the necessary measures to make generally available the 
information on which collective agreements are applicable (and to whom), and 
which terms and conditions of employment have to be applied by foreign service 
providers . . . .”73 Finally, the Draft Recommendation calls for Member States to 
“participate actively in a systematic and formal process of identification and 
exchange of good practice in the field of posting of workers through any forums of 
cooperation established by the Commission to that end, such as the envisaged High-
Level Committee . . . .”74 
One of the “main issues and questions on which the information will have to be 
exchanged” should comprise surveys of, and consultations with posted workers or 
their local labor representatives within their home Member State.75 This would be 
the most appropriate outlet for “voice,” as well as their best opportunity for 
representation and participation. For example, consultations by liaison officers of 
host Member States with posted workers or their unions would help determine the 
particular needs and interests of particular groups of posted workers, such as would 
be necessary in order for host Member Sates to determine what kinds of protections 
should be provided and at what levels these protections should be set. 
It is also submitted that this scheme of including posted workers and/or their 
proper representatives in the bipartite social dialogue should have a number of 
 
 67 Id. pmbl. ¶ 3.  
 68 Id. pmbl. ¶ 10. 
 69 Id. at 4. The use of hyphens around the word “specific” suggests that this might be up for 
revision in future drafts of the Recommendation. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. at 5. 
 74 Id. at 6. With respect to the High-Level Committee, see id. annex. 
 75 Id. at 4. 
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distinct advantages over the current model, where transnational and national trade 
unions are presumed to be able to speak for them. First, the end results of any 
determinations made by Member States as regards their determination of the material 
content of their mandatory requirements will appear more legitimate in the eyes of 
the Court, meaning that prediction of the results of proportionality review will not be 
excessively speculative and conjectural. At present, the Court has not provided any 
guidance on how determinations of the material content of mandatory rules can be 
made compliant with Article 49 EC and Directive 96/71/EC. Secondly, this method 
of consultation might perhaps provide a means by which Member States may 
insulate themselves from being found in violation of Article 49 EC; the freedom to 
provide services is presumptively safeguarded because foreign service providers will 
not be able to claim that the minimum rates of pay thus established constitute a 
hindrance to their freedom so to provide. It will be more difficult to prove a loss of 
comparative advantage. In the future, therefore, we should see fewer cases like 
Commission v. Luxemburg; i.e. of Member States being unable to produce sufficient 
evidence to support the claim of proportionality of their legislative measures. 
Thirdly, trade unions in the host Member States will be more knowledgeable about 
which demands would be appropriate to make via collective action with respect to 
any group of posted workers. Of course, this implies that they are provided the 
information produced as a result of the consultations between the posted workers and 
host Member State liaison personnel, in keeping with the principle of transparency.76 
As a result, collective actions will be more nuanced, and less likely to be found to be 
disproportionate to the overriding interest of the protection of workers. 
B. Comments about the Commission’s response 
In order to understand the Commission’s response, it would be useful to look at 
the Commission’s competences and obligations with regard to social policy as 
provided by the Treaty, and at the Commission’s general philosophy of governance. 
EC Treaty art. 138 provides that the Commission has a positive duty to consult with 
the social partners before it formulates social policy proposals. This has to be 
understood in the light of EC Treaty art. 137, which provides that the European 
social partners have a role in the implementation of Directives in the social policy 
area. Finally, EC Treaty art. 139 allows management and labor to conclude 
agreements in the area of social policy. Aside from its mandatory consultation 
obligations under EC Treaty art. 138, the Commission carries out “wide-ranging 
consultation with the European Social Partners in advisory committees on issues like 
health and safety at work, vocational training and social security issues for migrant 
workers.”77 One of the overarching purposes of these bipartite consultations is to 
“make a useful contribution to the Lisbon agenda . . .” which is to turn the EU, by 
2010, into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
 
 76 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union 46 (European Governance Papers, Paper No. C-07–
02, 2007), available at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf. 
 77 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 64, at 3. 
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world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion.”78 
One observation that may be made is that the IMI appears essentially to be an 
informal measure, which does not set out any formal avenues for the participation of 
posted workers and/or their representatives. Although the recommendations are 
couched in imperative language79 in a few places, no indication is given as to the 
particular legislative tools the Commission has in mind; indeed it rather appears that 
Article 4 of the Posted Workers’ Directive is the only legal basis for the IMI.80 As 
such, it is probably more accurate to say that whatever compulsion the IMI has arises 
not out of legal obligation, but out of practical considerations. In other words, it is 
“soft” law. In this regard, the Commission recommendations are in line with the 
Commission White Paper on European Governance of 2001,81 in which the 
Commission sees itself as possessing the real “legislative initiative,”82 while the 
Community co-legislature, consisting of the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers, is “limited to defining the essential elements of legislative acts in the form 
of framework directives, [which] in turn, define the conditions and limits within 
which the Commission performs its executive role.”83 The Draft Recommendation 
eminently proceeds from these general principles of governance: the broad 
underlying aspiration for the exchange of information is sketched out by the 
Parliament and Council in the Posted Workers’ Directive, and the concrete details 
are filled out by the Commission. However, an obvious concern here is one of 
constitutionalism: are the proposed measures too drastic and far-reaching to be 
carried out without the participation of the Community co-legislature? Does this not 
perhaps constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to the 
Commission? Or does the direct participation of all the interested and affected 
parties provide the measures with a kind of legitimacy different from, but equal to, 
that which arises out of rigid constitutional formalism? These questions, however, 
are beyond the scope of this note.84 
 
 78 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (2000) ¶ 5. The future of the Lisbon Agenda 
is looking increasingly dicey following the Irish “No” vote of June 2008.  
 79 E.g., Commission Recommendation on Enhanced Administrative Cooperation, supra note 66, at 
4 (“identifying the main issues and questions on which information will have to be exchanged and which 
thus should be included in the exchange system”) (emphasis added). 
 80 Id. at 5 (“Member States should, on the basis of the results of these preliminary examinations, 
furthermore assess and decide, in cooperation with Commission services, whether IMI provides the most 
suitable support for the information exchange as set out in Article 4 of [the Posted Workers’ Directive].”). 
 81 Commission White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001).  
 82 Gatto, supra note 57, at 497.  
 83 Id. at 497–98. 
 84 Interesting insights and parallels may be drawn from the legal mechanisms for pan-European 
collective agreements as envisaged under EC Treaty art. 139(2), which provides that collective 
agreements entered into by “management and labour” pursuant to EC Treaty art. 138(2)–(3) and 
“concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and the Member States or, in matters covered by Article 137, 
at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission.” 
Clearly, the Treaty envisages that where direct participation and representation obtains in the sphere of 
social policy, strict compliance with constitutional norms—i.e. passage of legislation by the European 
Parliament—is not needed. See Smismans, supra note 62. See also Case T-135/96, UEAPME v. Council, 
1998 E.C.R. II-2335, ¶¶ 88–89. However, EC Treaty art. 139(2) makes clear that this applies only to 
agreements “concluded at community level,” which means that the population of the EU can serve as the 
142 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW [Vol. 15 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The current state of the law concerning posted workers, as interpreted by the 
ECJ, contains many “black boxes,” in which there is a total lack of transparency, 
even though the Court recognizes the importance of that principle both in Laval85 
and in Rüffert.86 The most important of these include the manner in which Member 
States may go about determining the material content of the mandatory rules of 
minimum protection to be afforded to posted workers. The Commission’s proposals 
calling for greater cooperation in the exchange of information about applicable terms 
and conditions and of best practices, and for greater access to information are to be 
commended insofar as they vindicate the principle of transparency, which Sabel and 
Zeitlin speak of as being a crucial procedural requirement for the legitimacy of the 
“directly-deliberative polyarchy” model of current EU governance.87 However, the 
concept of transparency employed by the Commission, (and indeed by Advocate 
General Bot in his opinion88) is an impoverished one, if all it means is that decisions 
made should be easily accessible and noticeable to all, and should not admit of 
excessive vagueness.89 This is only one part of the concept. The principle of 
transparency should also protect the “interested parties’ right to information and to 
be heard at various stages of the decision making process.”90 Instead, this should also 
imply the establishment of “procedural requirements for ensuring active participation 
by a broad range of stakeholders in regulatory decision making.”91 Sabel and 
Zeitlin92 note that this is already the case in a number of areas, such as those which 
concern the European Railway Agency. The inclusion of posted workers and/or their 
representatives in the determination of their own mandatory protections appears to 
be the next logical step. 
 
 
necessary demos. There is yet much room for discussion where the agreements concerned are meant to 
operate purely within the confines of the Member States.  
 85 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-
11767, ¶110.  
 86 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2 C.M.L.R. 39 (2008). Although this principle is 
not specifically enunciated in the judgment, it is apparent from a reading of the judgment as a whole. 
 87 Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 76, at 46. 
 88 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Case C-346/06, Rüffert, 2007 WL 2726767, ¶¶ 134–35.  
 89 See generally Commission Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative, COM (2006) 194 
final (May 3, 2006).  
 90 Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 35 
(2004); See also Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 76, at 47. 
 91 Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 76, at 48. 
 92 Id. (quoting Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National 
Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform (NYU School of Law, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No. 01/04, 2004), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040101.pdf). 
